Category Archives: Peoples Bank of China (PBOC)

What Will Go Wrong in 2018?

James Mackintosh of the Wall Street Journal posts in today’s US print edition on “The 3 Things That Can Go Awry in 2018“. The article details three dynamics that, if played out as he suggests, could cause the global economy to trip in 2018. His summaries are good and compelling and, given our amazingly positive outlook today as 2017 comes to a close with all major nations growing at roughly the same time (an odd occurrence in its own right), they come at a good time to consider conservative actions against possible shifts next year.

The three are:

  1. Monetary Tightening. The story here looks at Fed and central bank interest rate hikes. We all know that interest rate raises have started, at least in the UK and US, even though the EU remains firmly stuck taking that drug. Japan is taking it slow, even as its economy shows much signs of improved life – Japan will have to continue pushing rates up in 2018, just as the EU will have to follow the US’s lead. The problem with this item is that there are us a lot of debt out there – corporate debt, public debt and yes, some consumer debt. It is not the same kind of debt that was part of the run-up to the crash that put us where we are today, but for some firms and some governments its big risky debt. As an example, and tangentially related, another article in the WSJ reports on a few firms that are high in debt that will be financial impacted by Trump’s tax reform – see Tax Plan Downside for Dell, Others in Debt. A lot firms have issues debt in the last few years in response to QE and near zero interest rates. As rates increase, debt load and repayments will increase. If inflation were to join the party, it could be a messy time for a number of firms and governments.
  2. China. This story has been used before since China has been the source of two recent periods where the US stock market (in fact the global stock market) fell by about 10%. As such, China’s management of its economy – shifting from a producer-based to consumer-based economy – is a major challenge. Debt remains a problem, and capital controls and currency exchange rates just add more menu items for Chinese leadership to wrestle with. Should China sneeze, so the saying goes, we would all fall could of a cold or something worse. Worse, there is no coordination between east and west – so we are somewhat at the behest of the Fed and People’s Bank of China – and we all hope they do the right thing. Of course, they will both do the right thing for their own constituents – or try to. Hence the lack of cooperation.
  3. A Correlation Correction. This for me is the more interesting and most likely issue to blow up in 2018, and it is the least talked about in the press since it is not as well understood. Mr. Mackintosh states, “one reason investors hold bonds is to cushion losses in a stock-market downturn.” This approach has worked for quite a while, as prices have diverged short-term all the while converging over the long-term. The risk is that should inflation appear in 2018 the relationship between stocks and bonds may revert to how it was in the 1980s and early 1990s, with rising bond yields being bad for share prices. The problem for me is that I think inflation will rise in 2018 to just levels that this will be the catalyst for change in the markers. If you read the tea leaves, there is ample evidence of a change underway. Many commodity prices are doing very well. Copper prices are, as an example, reportedly at recent high’s due to increased production. If you look at producer prices in the US, they are inching up now over 3%. Even though wage pressures remain subdued, the pressure is building. Though participating rates for males in the US aged 25-54 are at near all-time lows, yes the employment rates seems low and may go lower, but there remains some slack to take up the growth we will see. But that pressure is there. I think that by the second half of the year, certainly by Q3, US inflation forecasts will show that 3.5-4% are on the horizon. This won’t cause a panic, but it will lead the change and correction that will come. On top of this the author suggests that the Fed may just “give in” to the needs to cap the bloated asset prices we see all around us, to nip the bubble before it becomes unsustainable. Trump’s tax deal will push this peak out a year or two, but the dynamics are in play.

Reading between the lines you can see that all three of the authors ideas overlap and intersect. Inflation is mentioned directly in 2 of the 3; growth is everywhere; public policy too. As such he has hedged his bets and tried to call out the category of challenge. I will try to break the triggers into more simplistic sections.

As such, I give the following percentage probability for each driving a correction by the end of 2018:

  1. Monetary Tightening, most likely US led, due to over heating: 15%
  2. China growth, debt to currency issues: 28%
  3. EU or euro-zone debt or banking crisis: 15%
  4. Inflation-driven policy changes: 22%
  5. Japan public debt or growth challenges: 10%
  6. Emerging Market currency or debt issues: 5% (this one won’t trigger in isolation but might follow from one of the others, namely 1, causing a currency drain)
  7. Significant War triggering financial panic: 5%
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My Top 5 Biggest New Year Risks to the Global Economy

In order or scale, priority and impact, here are my picks for the five most critical trigger-points that may impact, negatively, a return to ‘old normal’. Currently we stand at the edifice of a new normal, the great stagflation, but the anti-establishment and populist changes taking place seem to suggest a knew-jerk reaction by nations fed up with socialist dressed-up-as-market politics that have led the West for 20 years.

  1. China’s economy stagnates or crashes. Debt levels are above EM levels and are now among the largest, approaching the incredulous Japanese levels. This dynamic is not sustainable for a nation whose currency is not a reserve currency. However the economy is the world second largest even without the development and emergence of whole swathes of other sectors such as healthcare and leisure, which may offset contracting first world growth over the next year or two. So the risk is there and there is no clear leaning one way or the other, yet. But debt is growing faster than these new sectors; exchange reserves at $3bn are limited (though huge), and currency value management is not market-bases. So greater risk is with the downside. China’s growth flags, currency sinks, counterbalancing US growth and confidence, creating a massive imbalance in the global economy. Europe watches on as global GDP sinks under its own debt weight. KPI’s to avoid/watch out for: China GDP falls to or below 4.5%; China’s debt load surpasses 300% of GDP.
  2. Trump quits after 18 months due to intractable political limitations that prevent policy changes he seeks related to healthcare, regulatory complexity, tax reform and trade. Trump’s political rhetoric is being replaced with solid business-based policy. However not all such policies have ever been tested at a national level and scale. Some efforts will fall foul to physical, social and political limitations. This may prove frustrating for Trump. As growth will return short term, such medium term frustration will lead Trump to claim, “My policies worked, see? But now the system has reached its limit and there is nothing I can do until the country agrees with me to shut down the whole government system! Since they are not ready, yet, I am ‘outa here’ until they are!” Markets crash, interest rates balloon, inflation rages all within a year. World economy sinks into the abyss. KPI’s to avoid/watch out for: US GDP 1H 2017 reaches 4.5% but Congressional conflict leads to policy deadlock ; vacancy in position at Whitehouse. 
  3. Emerging Marker currency crisis as massed capital investment is siphoned away towards a resurgent US economy and dominant dollar, as well as a stable and even growing China economy. This situation is already underway. The risk is that what is currently a reasonably ordered trend becomes a financial route. This is possible since the financial markets are starved of yield due to the collective policies of central banks to keep interest rates very low for too long and for the build up in their massive balance sheets. If the trend becomes a torrent, EM’s will have to yank up interest rates far beyond what their local economics can support and economic disaster will follow. This will ferment more political instability and drive increased destabilizing ebonies to ruin. Though the US may be growing well, compared to its peers, it’s the imbalance they tips the ship over. KPI’s to avoid/watch out for: dollar index, the weighted value against basket of currencies, surpasses 115. It is currently at 103.33, which is a 14 year high; EM interest rate differential balloons.
  4. Hard Brexit forced through by intransigent Europeans who think the EU experiment is more about political union than economic liberalism. A new trade deal, legal framework and social contract can be negotiated within a two year window. But only if politicians and civil servants want it too. Continental politicians however, under the strain from populist pressures, will equate intransigence over Brexit negotiations with an improved politicos standing with their electorates. Fool for them as this will actually create the opposite response for such behavior will simply worsen the economic climate. The lack of any sign of return to old normal will lead to political paralysis and the clock will time-out. Hard Brexit will be forced upon a supplicant Britian. Europe and UK economies will tank; currency wars will wage; global trade will collapse further. This will not sunk the global economy short term but will act as a dead weight slowing its resurgence down. KPI’s to avoid/watch out for: no agreement at end of two year period lost triggering of Article 50. 
  5. Latin or Indian debt or economic crisis. Much like with other EM’s, growing sectors of significant size around the world may blow up- India being the best example. India’s growth is different to China. It is more integrated socially and politically with the west, but it’s corruption levels are far greater than what one can see or observe in China. It is possible that local economic difficulties, hard to observe today, may trigger a collapse in confidence that leads to a destabilizing debt or currency crisis. Brazil’s economy is certainly in the dock currently; Argentina is struggling. India’s economy looks like paradise right now but the growth across the country is extremely uneven- you only have to look at public sector infrastructure investment. So should two such countries suffer local difficulties, the combination may result in significant risk to the global financial system. KPI’s to avoid/watch out for: two simultaneous financial/debt crisis afflicting EM or India.

These are my top 5 risks the global economy faces in 2017. I hope I am wide of the mark, in a positive way. I left Japan off the top 5 list yet their economy remains anathema to growth. The Japanese market invented the whole new normal cycle with a anaemic growth, massive debt, low inflation, and demographic contraction. And Japan has an amazing debt load that refuses to spook investors. Things may yet have a Japanese tinge before the year end. Does Japan, along with the US, lead the global economy back to the old normal!
What potential risks do you see?

Trumponomics is About to go Global

The critics were wrong and we know this now. On election market futures tanked on the hint that Clinton would lose and Trump might win. They and their pundits assumes that mediocrity and continuation of the Obama polices would permit the investor class to get richer so Trump represented change and risk. Not five hours later the market reverses and streaks ahead.  

Today the market continues to charge ahead. Trump’s election promises of lower taxes, less regulation, less government, seems to be recognized for what it is- a growth agenda. But more importantly, Trump’s winning will result in the export of his policies abroad.

The dollar was already strong against all other currencies. The Fed has no choice but to seek to get to normality with interest rates, and soon. The more the US economy morphs towards higher GDP growth, the more US interest rates will rise. This is a good thing. We need to return to the old normal or an approximation for it.  

But as rates rise so the dollar will surge alongside GDP. As the dollar surges imbalances in exchange rates will lead to two cycles:

  1. Liquidity will center on US and emerging markets and other developed marked will contract as money seeks yield. This will starve other regions of cash. At the same time US exports will be hampered (not overly important to US national economy as a percentage) and for other nations, exports will balloon as their currency is cheaper. The result will be that the US trade deficit will itself balloon again. Inflation will get a fillip due to increased US demand (note that inflation is already showing signs of stability) and as a result, trade partners will suffer greatly under either the weight of their new economic normal (zero rates, no inflation, high relative tax rate, loose monetary policy) being inconsistent with a resurgent US or lack of capital.
  2. As a result, trading partners will need to raise their own interest rates to help stabilize currency markets. This will alleviate some of the dollar’s strength. But if this is the only policy followed, those trading partners will sink into the abyss of stagflation. They will therefore need to emulate many other of Trump’s polices in order to ‘keep up’. So deregulation, lower taxes and more devolved government (perhaps focused on education improvements and local healthcare) will follow.

Trump and his ‘buddy’ Yellen will together export Trumponomics around the world. And it will likely start by the middle of 2017 as the first increase in interest rates in Japan, Europe and/or in some emerging market is triggered.  

The real question though, the real conundrum, concerns China. China is still in a massively debt-fueled growth period and its currency continues to fall against the dollar. Trumponomics will push the Yuan down further and faster, helping Chinese exports to the US. But China will need to raise rates internally, or sell US treasuries (to buy yuan) or buy selling dollars from its massive foreign exchange reserves. Any and all of these will force the Fed to raise treasury yield and rates. Thus the entire cycle that has kept the world economy down for six years will reverse and little will stop it accelerating quickly. It could easily overheat within two years.  

Biting the Hand that Fed Us

Mr. Kevin Warsh, a former member of the Federal Reserve board, now a distinguished visiting fellow in economics at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, pens a damning Commentary of the Federal Reserve in today’s US print edition of the Wall Street Journal.   

In “The Federal Reserve Needs New Thinking“, he slams the Fed for “….[T]he economics guild push[ing] ill-considered dogmas into the mainstream of monetary policy. The Fed’s mantra of data-dependence causes erratic policy lurches in response to noisy data. It’s medium term policy objectives are at odds with its compulsion to keep asset prices elevated. It’s inflation objectives are are far more precise than the residual measurement error. It’s output-gap economic models are troublingly unreliable.”

If that were not enough he adds: “And it expresses grave concern about income inequality while refusing to acknowledge that its policies unfairly increased asset inequality.”

Wow- this is a damning perspective from a ex-member of the Fed. I have to say that I tend to agree with his perspective. However the Comment falls short of the title: there is little new policy offering or suggestion to warrant any ‘new thinking.’ The challenge is to query what could or should the Fed and other central banks do differently.
One odd idea I toyed with a few months ago (see The ghost of Keynes haunts our global leaders and economic conditions today) is to globally reset interest rates as if a new normal had been established. What I mean to say is that central banks around the world should all raise their interest rates at the same time by an agreed amount in order to:

  • Preserve current interest rate differential between central bank authorities
  • Establish a more natural rate in order to reestablish normal market and investment operations

If we had nearer-normal interest rates the following would happen:

  • Private capital investment decisions might once again take on a normal demand curve and pattern, thus contributing and steering toward increased productivity
  • The cost of money will rise and so private firms will stop issuing bonds or taking out cheap loans only to increase share buy-backs, thus decreasing the inequality in invest class assets
  • M&A levels would fall to more normal competitive levels
  • Consumers will start to save again
  • Pension funds will have their unfunded portion of their liability reduced

All in all that would be a good day at the office. But it only works if the Fed and central banks in UK, Canada, Europe, Japan, and China agree and collaborate closely.  Additionally the IMF probably needs to leed this effort.

The other problem is the large overhang of debt that central banks now have on their balance sheets. These acquisitions represent government (and some private) debt. These enlarged balance sheets also distort the market. The problem is that central banks have no idea how to jettison these debts without completely upsetting the market again.  

So I guess the only option might be to collaborate with other central banks and agree some kind of normalized write-off. If all central banks agreed to write-off 75% of the government debt they hold, it would free up government spending (since they can start up again, hopefully on the right things this time like education and infrastructure) and the market prices will be balanced. This is of course a silly idea. But how else can we make progress with this challenge?

Yes, new thinking is needed. And a lot more collaboration. The solution will not be found in one central bank. We are too connected. We need a new Bretton Woods 2.0 agreement.

Alarm Bells Ringing: Productivity Dives and Credit Card Debt Soars in US; Private Investment in China Falls

Today’s US print edition of the Wall Street Journal was not a happy bunny. Articles on the front page (Productivity Fall Imperils Growth), inside front cover (Plastic Is Back In Style), and back cover (China’s Private Sector Withers as Growth Slows), pretty much portrayed a state of global gloom.

First, productivity. Readers of this blog will know my thoughts about productivity. Advanced economies are struggling to demonstrate productivity improvements and so our collective long-term growth prospects are falling. We can’t just adding more hours to get back to reasonable economic growth and pay off our debts- we need to become more productive.

Increasing red tape, political gridlock or uncertainty, uncompetitive tax rates, quantitive easing, low interest rates, and a regulatory framework that dissuades both business risks (in banking) and start-ups and capital investment (private sector investment) are crimping opportunities for productivity improvements.  Capitalism is being strangled.  I might even go as far to say that the technology or the IT industry is also struggling to demonstrate the value it can bring to business. Whatever the case, productivity is critical to our long-term success and few governments or leaders are even talking about it.

Second, credit card debt. From an economic cycle perspective the US economy is past the high-point of the recovery and most likely moving down toward the next down-cycle. Though you would not know this from the economic data. However, consumer debt is suggesting a bit of a problem is bubbling away.

After the financial crisis US consumer debt (and private sector debt, for that matter) took a bit of hiatus. We all took time off to unload some of our liabilities. However the report suggests that all the debt cycles are now trending up: mortgage debt ‘recovered’ first, then student loans, automobiles, and finally now we see credit card debt on the increase. What is interesting though is that this growth is mainly associated with those of us with a subprime or low credit score. In other words, that part of the consumer population that is most at risk of non-payment are stoking up on credit. The percent of the population with high credit scores has remained the same over the last ten years.  

Finally, China. The news is not good. The article clearly only refers to a few individual company interviews but does report on some economic data, for what it is worth. Private sector capital investment in things like factories and vehicles grew 2.8% in 1H 2016, compared to 30% in the last 10 years. June was the first time it actually fell since China started tracking the data in 2004.

Public sector spending has been very high recently, partly as an attempt to replace the loss of private investment and also to support of the needed investment to convert the Chinese economy from a supply-based manufacturing oriented economy to a demand-based consumer model. This will take years; all the while public sector debt is pilling up. The article also highlights a government official who suggests that falling productivity is part of the problem.

So with just one coffee out of the way, I was already not feeling good about the world. Off to go cook breakfast for the boys. I hope they have a better time back at school today!

Two Long Term Concerns Stand Taller then Brexit

Two articles in this weekend’s US print editions of the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times highlight the real concerns that threaten global growth, far more so than the ministrations of (hopefully) rational politicians soon to embroil in Brexit negotiations. One concerns China and the other Italy.
In “Rising Worries Cloud China GDP“, Alex Frangis of the WSJ reports that GDP continues to show signs of weakness and more importantly, how the declining GDP is accounted for, is more troubling than its decline. It seems private investment continues to decline and public debt continues to raise.
The declining private sector investment is bad since it already represents the lions share of investment. So as that declines, overall GDP declines and the smaller sector of public debt has to step up. But this is exactly the opposite trend China needs to help transition its economy from product based to consumer based.
Housing prices show signs of cooling though by western standards the numbers are impressive. At the same time anecdotal data on unemployment shows troubling shifts too. Overall the article suggests all the wrong data points we need to suggest positive changes. If anything, China is headed towards more problems and with that, so do we.
The second article, “Exploiting the fine print to save Italy’s Banks“, Dan MccRum a and Thomas Hale of the FT, report the troubling challenges facing EU regulators that still have not closed all the leaks that sprang up post the Greek crisis. Forget the fact that Greece’s economy remains a basket case, Italy’s banks are in trouble. Italy never addressed the bed debt problem overhanging their economy; they neither farmed out all major losses to debt holders, nor give off the bad debts to a ‘bad bank’. The chickens are coming home to roost.  
The resolution will be yet another fiddle by the EU. The Italian banks will need a bail out using public funds. Italy is always over budget and should face an EU penalty for financial promiscuity. It will be waived, as it has been waived for France and Germany before. Why do we even accept such rules if they just don’t count?  
If we ignore the politics of rule setting and bypassing then, and just focus on Italy’s financing, we can determine that the fundamental issues facing Greece are not dissimilar to Italy. What differs is how such nations seek to address those challenges. Italy needs to modernize and revamp its banking and investment sector. It needs to address losses that have piled up. Until, and if, it does, the Euro will remain a troubled currency. This is what sits at the heart of a rotten Europe.

The Relentless Rise of the Dollar and Fall of the Yuan

With sentiment at the Fed shifting toward a rate rise in June, and news today in the Wall Street Journal (see China loses resolve to revamp Yuan) that China is again worried about the pressure on the Yuan, we can all predict what is about to happen. 

The low interest rate the Fed promotes has been described as a response by the Fed to the lack of active policy by the US government to drive economic growth. The market distortion as a result of the low interest rate are frightening. There was a piece, albeit an opinion, in yesterday’s Financial Tines that explained the impact on savings (negative), retirement planning (disastrous), and debt (growing toward all time highs again).   But we will not change the government’s actions overnight, not until November that is, and even that is not guaranteed. So we are stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Fed wants to raise rates but has to avoid chocking off the meager growth that is limping along.

China has its own economic challenges. As it wrestles with the gradual transition from a manufacturing based economy to a consumer and services based economy, it is using the exchange rate to control its export competitiveness. Note that in recent times, in studying the UK’s transition between late 1950’s to the 1990’s, this effort won’t be easy or quick. But China is trying to move quickly, perhaps too quickly.  And despite the IMF signaling it’s faith that China was going to let the market drive the Yuan’s exchange rate, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) continues to take action to stabilize its currency. 

Assuming the Fed increase interest rates in June, we will all hear that big sucking sound again as capital flies from emerging markets including China back to American shores and the powering dollar. This will trigger a fall in the Yuan and the PBOC will again start to leverage its foreign exchange reserve to stem the losses. That reserve has fallen from an estimated $4th to about $3.2tn in the last year or so. The question is, how far can that reserve go in defending the Yuan?

Sterling was ‘broken’ in the 1970’s and the U.K. Government had to go to the IMF for a loan – check out “Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-Economic Policy and the 1976 IMF Crisis, Douglas Wass, 2008”.  That was a low point for the UK. The pound was again ‘broken’, perhaps more famously, by George Soros during ‘black Friday’ when the UK was forced to leave the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a pegged exchange-rate system that preceded the single currency, the euro. 

Clearly the PBOC won’t use up all its reserves. So the question becomes: what is the level at which the market expects massive red flags? Perhaps a leading indicator to watch are the monthly reported FX outflows from the PBOC. As that ramps up, the red flags will start to fly. And they won’t be the party flags of choice- they will be the economic panic flags that none of us want to see.